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1. 0

Introduction

Wages are an all time major issue of
economic policy in all economies, as
such, is an integral part of national
economic development policy. The
major fulcrum of wage policy is the
rate of increases, range and structure
of wage differentials, the extent of
variance between wage groups,
degree of desirable or tolerable
inequality as well as the adequacy of
the wage for the varying differentials
of education, skills and length of
service.
Given the relevance of income
policies to national development,
most countries strive to anchor a wage
policy that would strike a balance
between education, skills and length
of service against the demands of
minimizing income inequality between
the lowest and highest income
earning groups in society. However,
the composition or range of wages in
the public sector is not too central to
formulating wage policies in most
countries (Tule, 2004).
This is
because, the methodology for the
monetization of the paraphernalia of
public office is ill developed, as such; it
is often difficult to define what
constitutes an appropriate wage when

This paper examines the propriety of a national income policy in a deregulated
economy. The literature indicates that various interest groups in the country
tend to protect their narrow interests when negotiating for higher wages.
Consequently, the goals of government to achieve equitable income distribution
in the country with a national income policy are often at variance with the private
interests. While congenial atmosphere for collective bargaining was deemed
desirable for achieving effective income growth, an environment of consistently
rising prices was considered an anticlimax to growth and development.
Consequently, the paper opined that in a market economy, a national income
policy that does not include elements of restraint on prices development was
likely to fail. Thus, an income policy must be packaged as a set of
comprehensive macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal policies for effective
results. As part of the national income policy, an income guidepost with
provision for periodic review is advocated.
the public service is involved. In
addition, a deliberate public policy
designed to stagnate a rise in wages
in order to minimize the public debt or
contain inflationary pressures is
adversative to equity. We are then
confronted with answering the
question whether the premium
between public and private sector
wages can reasonably be narrowed
by public sector wage policy.
Income policies have been adopted
by countries because policy makers
are not satisfied with the results of the
market mechanism in allocating
income equitably. Thus, attempts to
reduce unemployment by expanding
aggregate demand (using fiscal
policy) often lead to intensified cost
and price pressures at level of
unemployment which are
uncomfortably high.
Attempts to
check these rapid wage increases
through price and wage controls or
some other policy often leads to
higher levels of unemployment.
The cause of this state of affairs is the
existence of sufficient concentration
of private economic power so that
various factor and product markets
have substantially become insulated

from the influences of aggregate
monetary and fiscal policies. Costpush inflationary pressures are the
most obvious manifestations of this
structural deficiency. The existence of
these private agitations of economic
power is not new. What is new
however, is the awareness of the
extent to which such power can be
utilized in a modern society. Although
people do not think in these terms,
perhaps, the motivating force behind
the continued agitation for higher
income encapsulated in an explicit
national income policy is the growing
dissatisfaction with the existing
machinery for equitable distribution of
income.
This dissatisfaction has become more
apparent in recent years with the
recent shift in income positions.
Whereas traditional income inequality,
endorsed by custom, may have been
more readily acceptable as a normal
state of affairs, recent quantum leaps
in income have made the situation
unacceptable, especially to the larger
section of society who may not have
been beneficiaries of this state of
affairs.
Consequently, when
organized labour see that by
concerted efforts they can increase
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their income levels and when such
efforts are bolstered by feelings of
inequality, the need for a workable
policy becomes imperative.
As Tule (2004) found, an efficient
public sector wage policy requires a
clear understanding of the behavioral
relationships in the domestic labour
market. Such a policy needs to
address the constraints of the market,
relevance of labour supply in wage
determination, and the conditions
under which employees and
employers would prefer a certain
wage level to another. These issues
coalesce into questioning the validity
of government wage fixing or
minimum wage policy in a
deregulated market.
In efficient
market hypothesis, supply creates its
own demand and establishes its own
equilibrium. Thus, in a deregulated
labour market, government only
intervenes to establish the rules and
regulate against fraud. Typically, a
deregulated labour market is a free
market in which individual property
rights are protected (including labour
rights).
It is the opposite of a
controlled market where the
government regulates the means of
production, the usage of goods and
services as well as the pricing and
distribution of labour and output.
In a free market, labour is freely
exchanged at a price arranged solely
by the mutual consent of sellers and
buyers of the services. Thus, buyers
and sellers do not coerce each other
in the sense that they obtain each
other's consent without threat,
intimidation or physical force nor are
they coerced by a third party (such as
government).
Thus, participants
engage each other because they both
believe that what they are getting from
each other is worth more than or as
much as what they have to offer.
Thus, price or wage is the result of
buying and selling labour decisions en
masse based on the law of demand
and supply.
A deregulated labour market
contrasts with the regulated market in
which the government is directly or
indirectly involved in regulating the
price of labour. This intervention by
government makes the market to be
less efficient. The price of labour in
the market place helps communicate
consumer demand to producers and

thus directs the allocation of
resources toward consumer and
investor satisfaction.
Thus, in a
deregulated market, the price of
labour is a result of a plethora of
voluntary transactions, rather than
political policy anchored by state
might. Thus, through free competition
between owners of labour and users,
wages are fixed, and tend to rise or fall
appropriately as conditions demand.
In this paper, we explore the place of a
national wage policy in a deregulated
economy. The thesis as outlined
above is that government wage policy
in a market economy should be
confined to outlining the conditions for
avoiding fraud and in achieving
equitable income distribution.
To
further develop this idea, we structure
the paper into five sections.
Following this introduction, we outline
the major income policy issues in
Section 2. In Section 3, we undertake
a survey of income policy exercises in
Nigeria from the pre-independence
era to 1986 when the deregulation of
the economy started under the
Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP). Section 4 develops conditions
in efficient deregulated markets and
the possibility of a national income
policy within that setup. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2.0

Income Policy Issues in a
Deregulated Economy

Income policy is designed to amongst
other things; redistribute income to
achieve specific social goals. The
perceived goals to be achieved arise
from society's unwillingness to accept
the adverse adjustment effects that
would emerge from the operation of a
free market.
Thus, it is the
unwillingness to allow the market to
make the adjustments that
government intervenes; ostensibly
with a national wage policy to achieve
equitable income redistribution.
However, while government hopes to
minimize to the barest minimum, the
economic inefficiency arising from the
exercise, it nevertheless, encourages
rent seeking and moonlighting activity
from labour, especially in the public
sector. This sub-optimal behaviour of
labour tends to decrease national
productivity, while increasing
overheads. And as shown by Tule
(2004), although wage fixing
exercises in Nigeria were targeted at
20

the public sector, the private sector
tended to take a queue from there in
fixing their wages.
Income policy involves a number of
issues some of which include:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

(vi)

income policy affects all sectors
of the economy and regulations
such as tax policy affect
particularly income distribution
amongst the sectors and
across income groups
within sectors such as
agriculture, discriminatory
policies such as between
export and food crops affect the
relative income positions of the
farmers
between the freedom of
individual decision makers lies
the extent of government
involvement in production and
marketing decisions
There is the interdependence
amongst sectors as a ban on
inputs in one sector severely
affects income in another
sector
between domestic policy and
foreign policy objectives, higher
domestic support prices tend to
reduce the volume of foreign
trade
between sectoral or
microeconomic objectives and
macroeconomic objectives,
higher product prices versus
inflation, subsidy/social policies
to reduce unemployment
versus the budget deficit.

Conditions for Comprehensive
Income Policy:
Most regulation policies are
formulated to meet narrowly
construed objectives, and income
policy is no exception to this rule. The
attendant programs focus on
achieving the stated objectives. For
income policy in particular, all sectors
of the economy must be effectively
integrated with the domestic
economy.
In Nigeria, an income policy that fails
to appropriately integrate the
agricultural sector into the domestic
and export economy would be
counterproductive. For instance,
increased dependence on foreign
imports now transmits substantial
instability to the domestic economy.
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The existing structure of production in
the country shows that the food
system is disjoint from the domestic
economy. Thus, the performance of
the domestic economy does not take
account of domestic food supply and
the agricultural system. The evidence
is that:


Nigerian farmers are still price
takers



The level of industrialization is
dwindling instead of growing



The decreasing proportion of food
naira accounted for by non-farm
inputs shows the dwindling bases
for enhanced income in the
country

Income policies may have
undesirable or unintended indirect
consequences or even direct
consequences. The need for
equitable income distribution can be a
powerful mechanism for motivating
greater use of potential influence over
wage decisions. For instance, why
should a blue collar worker worry that
his wage increases are exceeding the
growth of his productivity when he
believes that the top management is
being overpaid, and that white collar
workers and stockholders are
obtaining too large a share of the
proceeds of current income and
capital gains, when in fact, they all go
to the same market?
More damaging to monetary and fiscal
stabilization policy is the creation of
conditions possible for prices to rise
when aggregate demand is dwindling.
The issue is why powerful citizen
groups should be concerned that their
demand for specific public benefits
and subsidies exceed the current
fiscal capacity of government to pay
especially when they believe that
other income recipients are not
working more than them nor paying
their fair share of income taxes.
Consequently, the notions of fiscal
dividends have evaporated as new
expenditure initiatives, coupled with
high level corruption, have outpaced
even the most optimistic estimates of
government revenues. These
institutional rigidities aggravate social
pressures, leading to incessant
demand for higher wages and
constituting a demonstration effect on
other parts of the economy.

It is these kinds of Pareto sub-optimal
conditions that have led to aggravated
experiments in income policies in
most market economies. However,
the realization is that restraint,
whether compulsory or voluntary, is
needed on demand for unbridled
growth in income by segments of
society. The usual reasons of high
inflation used in the demand for higher
wages is the result of either
anticipations of greater inflation or the
familiar cost-push phenomenon,
hardly ever due to excess demand. It
is pertinent to note that income
policies have been introduced
because market imperfections have
substantially weakened the ability of
monetary and fiscal policies to
achieve desired levels of economic
growth and price stability. In what
follows, we shall examine income
policies from two perspectives: short
and long term.
Short Term Considerations
Although we are contemplating a
deregulated market environment, in
the short run, we have to accept the
continued departure of income policy
from the free market model and to use
government intervention as a
counterbalancing force. Given the
drift towards the market in recent
years, formal wage fixing and control
may not have a place in modern
economic calibrations, and ditto, a
formal national wage policy that tends
to legislate across the board minimum
wage for all classes of labour. As long
as wage policy does not limit the
ability of labour to negotiate a living
wage for its services, nor unduly task
the capacity of both government and
private sector to pay as well as reward
declining productivity, a battle line
may not seem eminent. However,
where the reveres is the case, then,
the desirable wage policy would be
one that seeks to promote labour and
employment dynamism while
removing fraud in wage fixing and
payments.
A Galbraiththian approach of limiting
wage policies to larger labour unions
and business entities, which seem to
be subject to governmental influence
and public pressure, may be needed.
Once central wage negotiations are to
be dismantled, government may need
to take the initiative to arrive at some
type of national consensus
21

(guideposts or objectives) with all
stake holders to establish an
acceptable and enduring framework
for collective bargaining on wages and
productivity issues. However, the fear
of this model as observed by Tobin
(1972) is that an arbitrary imitative
component in wage settlements
exists, which may be influenced by
national standards. Hicks (1955) had
argued that wages can be influenced
by non-economic forces such as
customs, or by what the negotiating
parties perceive as right.
From the foregoing, there is no unique
or once for all institutional structure for
achieving national consensus on
these purely economic issues of
income policy. Any structure adopted
is likely to show substantial strains and
weaknesses arising from pressures.
However, experience of most
countries is that as one structure
wears out, another contemporary
structure is developed. One thing is
certain, as individuals or groups find
ways to exploit existing structure for
personal rather than the national gain,
such a structure would persistently
break down and need modification.
Modification or new polices must take
account of the consensus building
requirement to ensure acceptability
and implementation.
As a cardinal objective of national
income policy, the drive to engender
an equitable income distribution must
weigh higher than the choice of
specific numeric targets to be met. In
addition, designing an equitable wage
policy as much as possible should be
people participatory. The degree of
voluntarism could vary over time.
An income policy must not convey the
impression of an omnibus Father
Christmas where it promises apples
on mango trees. The fact that income
policies tend to breakdown as the
economy approaches full employment
or even below it shows that income
policies have a limited lifespan.
Keynes (1946) provides an eclectic
approach to what is needed in the
short run. According to him,
No one can be certain of anything in
this age of flux and change. Decaying
standards of life at a time when our
command over the production of
material satisfactions is the greatest
ever, and a diminishing scope for
individual decision and choice at a
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time when more than before we
should be able to afford these
satisfactions, are sufficient to indicate
an underlying contradiction in every
department of our economy. No plan
will work for certain in such an epoch.
But if they palpably fail, then, of
course, we and everyone else will try
something different.
In the Long Run
Long run considerations of income
policy should focus on private
economic blocks that have been
insulated from the impacts of
monetary and fiscal policy.
The
departures from the effective
functioning of the market are often
instigated by government
involvement/interference.
Frequently, government statutes and
regulations are constraining and
counterproductive to the effective
functioning of the markets.
Consequently, in the long run, we
need to examine in totality, the sum of
government legislations, rules,
regulations, and guidelines which
interfere unduly with the efficiency of
the market, raise prices or give the
economy an inflationary bias.
Government through the inefficient
administration of its social schemes
has sheltered numerous groups from
market forces, thus creating
excessive costs to other sectors of the
economy and even on other groups
within the sheltered subsidy sector.
Consequently, the obstacles to
change should not be
underestimated. The cost of each
option may not be the right criterion to
making a choice. What is relevant is:
the benefits to some group would
certainly outweigh the costs to them
and so a powerful group would always
exist to oppose the policy once it is at
the higher costs end.

would require fundamental changes
in the administration of government
expenditure programs and the use of
public funds which often tend to be
sub-optimal, due to social welfare and
equity considerations. This would
entail an ambitious and extended
effort, most likely to set in motion
strong political and social counter
pressures. The most propitious time
for such changes is not during times of
high unemployment. A stock of the
various sub-optimal social schemes
may reveal a huge cost which outweights the benefits even to the
groups directly benefiting. With so
many sectors of society attempting to
insulate themselves against
uncertainties and competition, efforts
at evolving a national wage policy
under a deregulated economy may
remain largely pedestrian and selfdefeating. The deadweights of the
interferences with the mechanism of
economic progress and productivity
may reduce the absolute size of the
benefits available to the larger sector
of society.
3.0

A Survey of Wage and
Income Policies in Nigeria

The Federal Government has since
colonial times retained the
prerogative to establish broad based
income policies in Nigeria. In pursuit
of this prerogative, the government
had carried out this exercise through
the use of wage commissions
(Anyafo, 1996). Broad based wage
and income bargain institutions in
Nigeria's public sector dates back to
the early 1900s when the country was
still under colonial regime. However,
the formal institutionalization of these
wages and income commissions and
committees was done in the 1930s by
the colonial administration.

Efforts to reduce impediments to free
market operation including labour
resistance to requirements bothering
on productivity increases need to be
evenhanded. The effort to identify
special protective devices must be
broad and comprehensive, covering
all stake holders.
Such an
undertaking would require
considerable support from all
stakeholders.

The factors which have influenced the
growth in income in the 1920s through
the 1950s were expansion in public
utilities (water, electricity, housing and
a relatively integrated transportation
system). In addition, exploration and
mining activities increased labour
overheads. These activities bred a
pool of skilled and semi-skilled
artisans, through formal and informal
training systems influenced public
sector compensation policies in the
country (FOS, 1998).

Any acceptable national wage policy

Thus, government established a
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number of Wage Commissions to
review and define a national wage
policy for the country. These include:
Bridges Committee (1941), Tudor
Davis Commission (1945), Harragin
Commission (1946), Miller
Committee (1947), Cowan
Commission of Enquiry (1948),
Gorsuch Committee (1955), Mbanefo
and Morgan Commissions (1959),
Morgan Commission (1963), Adebo
Commission (1970), Udoji
Commission (1973).
Continued resistance to labour
demands led to prolonged tensions
between organized labour and the
colonial government. In the end, the
colonial administration not wishing to
risk its more expanded objective of
maximizing economic gains, caved in
to the prolonged demand of labour
and established internal machinery
for bilateral public sector wage
negotiation, the Harragin
Commission in 1946. However, its
recommendations did not evolve a
new minimum wage. This failure led
to much civil unrest by organized
labour and paved the way for the
establishment of the Cowan
Commission of Enquiry in 1948 to
look into the immediate and remote
causes of the crises.
The Cowan Commission of Enquiry
introduced two Whitley Councils in its
report. The one Council was in
charge of Clerical Staff and Office
employees (the white collar workers)
and the other was for industrial and or
manual workers.
Although the
Whitley Councils were ineffective in
engendering an acceptable income
policy, nevertheless, they were
retained as the income policy
document till 1964. The inability of
the Whitley Councils to effectively
provide compensation for labour,
minimize income inequality and
provide for differentials of education
and experience led to the breakdown
of collective bargaining between
labour and the colonial government.
C o n s e q u e n t l y, t h e c o l o n i a l
administration in 1963, established
the Morgan Wages and Income
Commission to examine what
constituted appropriate income policy
for the differentials of labour.
The Morgan Wages and Income
Commission (1963) recommended
the establishment of the National
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Wages Board.
Consequently, in
1964, the National Wages Board was
established to establish broad based
criteria for increases in wages and
income. The National Wages Board
did establish the conditions but these
proved ineffectual as salaries and
wages lingered far behind national
income. Consequently, government,
succumbing to pressure from
organized labour, in 1973, established
the Udoji Commission on salaries and
wages.
The end of the civil war presented
substantial challenges to government
to redistribute income across regions
in the country. The oil boom provided
impetus for implementing the income
redistribution to achieve more
balanced growth in the country.
C o n s e q u e n t l y, g o v e r n m e n t
established the Jerome Udoji
Commission to look into the issue of
salaries and wages across board.
The recommendations of the Udoji
Commission led to a displacement of
the Wages Board with the National
Negotiating Councils I, II and III. The
National Negotiating Councils were
inaugurated in 1976. The mandate of
the National Negotiating Councils was
to negotiate salaries, fringe benefits
and general conditions of service for
the public service, but excluding
partial and fully commercialized
parastatals, state owned companies
and academic and non-academic
institutions (Universities, Research
Institutes, Teaching Hospitals, etc).
The military governments established
a number of salary review
commissions in response to prevailing
economic conditions which made
existing wages untenable. However,
by 1986 when SAP was introduced,
government deregulated the
economy, including wages-requiring
labour to negotiate directly with their
employees. Hitherto, public sector
wage adjustment exercises provided
impetus for the private sector to
negotiate new wage increases with
their employees. Although much has
not changed with respect to this,
however, the then existing automatic
adjustment mechanism between the
public to private sector seem to have
lost much of its steam such that public
sector wage increases no longer
translated to automatically meeting
similar demands in the private sector.
What has emerged from the survey of

the wages commissions is that their
recommendations were short-lived,
leading to agitations for higher wages
once government policy generated
any form of inconvenience on labour.
Another feature of wage policy in
Nigeria over the years was the
absence of a standard framework for
wage and income adjustment.
Consequently, wages were adjusted
based on the strength of labour and its
capacity to pressurize government to
make an award. Often, arm twisting
existed. To enable government sell a
hard economic policy, a wage
increase was awarded. Wage
increases at the Federal level were
accompanied by prolonged strike at
the state level before such awards
could be implemented at that level of
government. Consequently, Federal
workers were perpetually at
advantage when wage increases
were contemplated.
Available evidence indicated that
wage increases were done on the
spur of the moment not having been
provided for in the fiscal appropriation
for the year in which they became
effective. Thus, the implementation
of salary and wage increases led to an
overshooting of the boundaries of
fiscal discipline leading to higher
prices, loss of productivity arising
from labour unrest and strikes. In the
end, the new wage was overtaken by
rising prices setting the stage for a
new round of higher income demand.
The Status Quo
There currently exist wide range
disparities between income groups in
the country. While the poor are
indeed very poor, attempts at income
redistribution have been lopsided,
being targeted at the white collar
worker with the hope that proceeds
would be redistributed to the very
poor. Within the white collar group,
huge differences are identifiable
between Federal and State Civil
servants. Within the civil service
itself, wide differentials between
grades are noticeable.
While disparities may not be
completely eliminated in income
structure, obvious yawning gaps are
counterproductive. While the need to
look up to the next grade is
appreciated, punitive structural
23

defects should be eliminated so that
officers at the lower grade feel grossly
imbalanced mentally when they
differential in take home is compared
with their next higher level officers.
The existence of such disparities at
the national level encourages income
marginalization across sectors,
establishments, different strata of
government and the economy
generally. The state of affairs does not
create room for effective
implementation of a national income
policy.
While productivity measures may be
difficult yardsticks for gauging the
need for increased income in the
public service, in the private sector, the
methodology for measuring such
output is advanced. And whereas the
public sector may be preoccupied with
its social welfare functions,
nevertheless, it sets the tone and
signposts the directions of economic
development in the country including
income policy.
Thus, a lopsided
income structure in the public sector
stigmatizes efforts at income
redistribution and creates a
permanent basis continued labour
agitation for equity in income
distribution.
4.0

Deregulating the Market

The absence of competition may allow
an excessive number of institutions to
survive, including inefficient ones that
would ordinarily not survive under
market conditions, and hence breed
low productivity due to the rent
seeking behaviour of the employees
enjoying subsidy wages (with low
productivity) and a moral hazard
problem. Although economists may
have us believe that the market
remains the best stimulus to
productivity growth, the theoretical
and empirical basis for this has only
recently been established.
A wide range of literature exists on the
effects of competition on wages and
productivity (Nickell, 1996; Vainiomaki
and Heden, 2003).
Although
Symeonidis (2002) has shown that
profitability may fall in the short run, it
may recover in the longer term
following increased competition if
there is free entry and free exit and
market structures are allowed to
adjust, no such simple relationship
has been established in the literature
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between market structure or
profitability and the intensity of
competition.
The standard view is that during
recession, workers lose jobs from
established employment
relationships. The prevalent thinking
here is that workers lose their jobs
because wages are sticky downwards
and employers no longer find the
relationships profitable after the
recession shock. The high level of
unemployment persists until the
workers can find new jobs. Hall
(2005) finds that available evidence
supports the contrary. An adverse
shock does not affect established
employment, especially in
deregulated economies where
collective bargaining affects few
workers outside the public sector.
Job relationships end when it is
convenient for employer and
employee to terminate the
relationship. A shock raises the level
of unemployment by lowering the
profitability of hiring new workers.
On the other hand, unemployment
does not rise because of a bulge of
layoffs but because workers entering
the job market from previous
jobs/school/home activities,
experience unusual difficulty in
finding job placements.
Inflation today has been traced to
fairly stable structural aspects of labor
and products markets. The effects of
this, however, depend on the extent of
national resource utilization.
Another important element is the
dynamic mechanism through which
current perceptions of price and
income changes are generated from
past events. In addition to these
purely economic factors, a plethora of
social and political considerations are
identifiable. From a structuralist point
of view, the inflationary process is
essentially the by-product of a
struggle over income distribution,
occurring in a society where most
owners of labour have little bargaining
power over the product due to large
scale unemployment and fear of
losing existing jobs. However, given
perfect market conditions, the
negotiating power of labour is
encapsulated in the trade union,
whose power is affected by structural
and market factors, the manner in

which the trade union exercises that
power is affected by perceptions of
what is happening and by political and
social attitudes and norms. The trade
union therefore, uses market power to
negotiate for increased real income
and defensively, to protect real
income from past and expected
increases in production or general
price levels.
Once the inflation
process is initiated, increases in
wages and prices become basically
defensive-made in an effort not to lag
behind. However, every defensive
wage secured by labour threatens the
real income of other sectors of the
economy and spurs an endless chain
of new defensive wage increase
moves.
This view of inflation-induced wage
struggle to protect the erosion of real
income substantially provides a more
meaningful explanation of wage-price
behaviour in a modern deregulated
economy.
More significantly
however, is the fact that the problem it
attempts to address has become
aggravated in recent times as the
social norms regulating group
behaviour have for various reasons
become more tolerant of an
increasingly aggressive use of market
power.
Indeed, society is becoming more
sensitive to the existence of income
inequalities or injustices and is
therefore, becoming more readily
supportive or tolerant of efforts by
underprivileged groups to improve
relative income, through political,
economic or social action or both.
However, when the market price of
labour or other products become
weapons in the struggle over income
shares, the underprivileged that
possess little market power is the
likely casualty, losing out to the
already privileged groups. This is the
space for national income policy
administration to minimize the
frustrations of the underprivileged
group in the market and remove the
fraud of the privileged groups.
If a national income policy is not
designed to address these concerns,
then, the economy would remain
subject to substantial inflationary
pressures. With time, as both the
labor and product markets garner
considerable market power to outdo
each other, the economy would be
24

worse off. Thus, we submit that
inflationary consequences of a
struggle over the share of income can
only be controlled through the
institution of a national income policy.
The national income policy is here
conceived as a system of restraints
(i.e. more explicit and forceful social
norms) which controls unbridled
expansion in income with slight rise in
prices without commensurate growth
in productivity. The pattern of these
restraints should be systematically
integrated with other measures so as
to guide the evolution of income
shares in a manner which society
judges to be fair and equitable. The
implication is that a successful
national income policy cannot be
pursued independent of price
restraint policy.
While compulsory wage controls is
not being contemplated here, an
examination of wage-price guidepost
is advocated. The guideposts are a
set of definitions of patterns of wages
behaviour which, if generally followed
would be consistent with efficient
resource allocation, reasonable
equity and approximate stability of the
overall price level. The strength of
this approach is anchored on the fact
that in collective bargaining, wage
rates are not set by impersonal
market forces but human beings
using collective decisions.
Consequently, the decision makers
have room for judgment (or no real
decision would exist).
Over the
relevant time horizon, the decision
makers do not usually know what
approximate wage or price would
maximize net income. Consequently,
questions are settled by rule of the
thumb, comparison, considerations
of equity, policy or public appearance.
Thus, if government's arguments for
restraint make sense to any of the
participants in the decision process,
to the extent that any of them prefer to
avoid or minimize public criticism, and
to the extent that they believed
government's appeals and their
decisions were tailored to affect other
wage and price decisions, then the
guideposts would have been
successful. The guideposts therefore,
are designed to influence employer's
collective bargaining rather than
directly affect union attitudes or
aggressiveness. An efficient national
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wage policy must therefore,
encapsulate the element of collectivity
and consent.
For this to be
forthcoming, employees must see the
system as being fair and equitable to
all. Thus, a system which embodies
sacrifices on the one side must be
seen to be commensurate with the
costs to be incurred by the other.
Members must also believe that the
restrictions its members accept on
their freedom to do as they please will
achieve something important.
A national income policy anchored on
purely voluntary participation may
have limited results.
It might
therefore, be otherwise unwise to take
a chance at a purely voluntary wage
policy compliance system.
Also,
courting adherence through
widespread publicity to violations of a
voluntary policy may prove as a self
destructive policy. We believe that the
envisaged system, which has
provision for periodic renegotiation
would offer enough flexibility to permit
the relative wage changes that are
essential for efficient resource
allocation.
5.0

Conclusion and Policy
Considerations

The paper surveys the literature on
income policy and found that in both
controlled and deregulated markets,
an income policy is needed to guide
the direction of income growth. In
addition, such a policy was necessary
to avoid exploitation and fraud as well
as to the advancement of the narrow
interests of members of society.
Consequently, the paper advocated
the development of guideposts with
wide ranging consultations, which

would be used for future income
growth in the country.
It was
observed that such guideposts would
need to be periodically reviewed. In
addition, a national income policy
must be pursued in conjunction with a
price restraint policy to avoid
unbridled growth in prices.
The income policies reviewed were
born out of exigencies of the moment.
Consequently, the policy consisted
essentially in establishing ad-hoc
committees/commissions to produce
a wage document. After long
deliberations with organized labour,
government implemented parts of the
recommendations, setting the stage
for another round of labour agitations
for higher wages. It was observed
that such a policy was
counterproductive and needed a
review.
The paper also examined existing
income structure and the wide
ranging disparities across board in the
country. The paper observed that
such inequalities and divergences
between Federal and State wages as
well as between grades and across
sectors was sufficient to create
industrial disharmony within the
labour force and encourage
corruption, rent seeking and
moonlighting activities.
Consequently, the paper advocates
for a review of the status quo with a
view to achieving a more balanced
national income distribution.
As part of the policy issues, we
observe that if the underlying
structural rigidities of the economy
which hamper the effective
transmission of market mechanism
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impulses were not addressed,
inflationary pressures may exacerbate
another need for new wage demands
with attendant social pressures.
Unless strong actions were taken to
reduce the inherent market
imperfections, the country may be
increasingly resorting to greater direct
controls over wages. The choice may
actually be between fostering a
greater degree of competition in
private markets and relying more
heavily on government control over
private decision making.
A more fundamental policy of price
control or restraining surges in
aggregate demand would involve
vigorous and timely coordination of
monetary and fiscal policies. Inflation
would not abate through a mere
application of demand management
policies.
Another national income policy would
involve structural changes to the
national manpower policy, designed to
make labor supply more easily mobile
between employers, industries,
occupations and regions. There is
also the need to eliminate a host of
private practices and government
policies, adopted in effort to protect
one or another private interest at the
expense of the national interest.
These polices today create strong
structural downward rigidities of
particular wages and unnecessary
bottlenecks and immobility's at high
employment. Some of these provide
artificial support for the market power
of particular groups, while others
directly and unnecessarily raise costs.
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